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Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Emily Robinson
As we absorb the shocks of the pandemic and 
prepare for the battles ahead, Labour needs to be 
creative, clear-sighted, and unafraid of complexity. 
We must defend liberal democracy against the 
rising tide of the far right, while also making the 
case for a transformative political economy that 
radically redistributes power and wealth. We must 
be a party of values, while still honouring our 
founding tradition as a party of labour. And we 
must focus on the local, while remaining true to our 
internationalist principles. 
Fascism is like a virus. As Hannah Malone writes in this issue, like a virus, it ‘comes in waves’; between ‘outbreaks’, it doesn’t disappear, but survives ‘in the nooks and crannies of society’. It relies on a ‘host organism’, such as the 
democratic state, and benefits from ‘crises of the liberal state and weaknesses of 
its “immune system”’. It comes in different strands, often with distinct national 
inflections, and finally, like a virus, it ‘mutates constantly’. This mutability makes 
precise definitions of fascism tricky; for some far-right movements today, categories 
like ultra-nationalism, illiberalism, authoritarianism, populism, or alt-Right are 
more appropriate. Nevertheless, a constellation of malign tendencies – to pit ‘the 
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people’ against external and internal ‘enemies’, often racialised; to oppose liberal 
democracy; to celebrate a strong-arm leader; to ennoble violence – unite these 
movements. Opposing them is one of the left’s most important tasks today.
Because fascists undermine and criticise liberal democracy, our opposition must 
involve defending its traditions. This is one reason we focus on liberalism in this issue 
of Renewal. Liberalism is, for some parts of the left, suspect. This is particularly the 
case for those associated with Blue Labour, who see liberalism as denoting atomised 
individualism; universalising, and deaf to the music of local tradition that knits 
particular communities together. Katrina Forrester (interviewed in this issue), in her 
book In the Shadow of Justice, draws out what is likely to be a surprising finding for 
those critics: John Rawls, father of liberal egalitarianism, was profoundly interested in 
communitarian thinking and placed it at the heart of his philosophical system. Rawls 
was a liberal in that he thought the ‘basic structure’ of society should enable individu-
als to pursue their own plans for a fulfilling life. But he was, on a deeper level, a 
communitarian who thought individuals necessarily developed their sense of what 
those plans might be in the context of their families, their associations (of faith, of 
work, and so on) and their communities. Labour must strike a balance between 
valuing our existing associations and communities, and empowering individuals to 
work to change them – or to leave them if they want to. And, fundamentally, Labour 
needs to assert that it is a society where power and wealth are shared more equally 
which protects communities while also empowering individuals. 
In recent years, a debate has taken place between those – like Jan Werner-Müller and 
Timothy Snyder – who think we should recover cold war liberalism as a defence 
against fascism and totalitarianism, and scholars like Samuel Moyn and Helena 
Rosenblatt, who find cold war liberalism too narrow and individualistic, constricted 
and unambitious. Moyn and Rosenblatt argue that we need, instead, to recover the 
longer and more varied history of liberalism. Writing in this issue, Iain Stewart 
follows this line of argument in suggesting that we need to move beyond cold war 
liberalism and revisit more capacious and emancipatory versions of liberalism. Too 
often liberalism has become associated with defending society as it is, not as it could 
be. But is liberalism – even a strong liberal egalitarianism which guarantees eco-
nomic rights as well as civil ones – enough? Forrester is sceptical. There is much to 
rescue from liberal egalitarianism, she argues, but, fundamentally, her work histori-
cises and thus renders unfamiliar Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism. By revealing how 
profoundly Rawlsianism was shaped by the US and the UK of the 1950s, she shows 
how much we need to rethink for today. No longer can we assume that there is a core 
of consensus at the heart of society that can contain or override conflict; no longer 
should we take the straight, white man as the imagined subject of liberal democracy.
Stewart also points out, though, that not every cold war liberal was the defensive 
proto-neoliberal that critics sometimes imply: there are lessons to draw, even here. 
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As Stewart writes, the focus of cold war liberals ‘on democracy’s social and eco-
nomic conditions of possibility’ was important. The economic model which they 
thought guaranteed those conditions would today be ‘ecologically indefensible and 
regressive from the standpoint of gender equality’; but the effort to think sociologi-
cally about liberal and social democracy is vital. Liberal democracy falters when its 
‘immune system’ is compromised by social shocks: in the interwar period, for 
example, hyper-inflation in Germany, the Great Depression, mass unemployment, 
gross inequality, social misery. The left can win a broad base of support for some of 
the things we need to do on the basis of this argument: we need a society where 
wealth and power are shared more equally in order to inoculate against the far right.
Covid-19 is undoubtedly one of those shocks. It has revealed the fragility and 
inadequacy of our social safety nets to many who had previously thought themselves 
protected: some previously secure careers have dissolved, comfortable care arrange-
ments have been disrupted. Yet, the experience of the pandemic has been primarily 
structured by class, and its intersections with race and gender: by our ability to work 
from home, to avoid public transport, to access technology and good food, to draw 
on savings, to share the responsibility of caring, and by the spaces and conditions in 
which we live. All of these have impacted not only the ease with which we have 
navigated the past few months, but also our chances of surviving them.1 As Lyn 
Brown argued in our last issue, one of Labour’s central projects and pitches must be 
to transform our society and ‘ensure that our common life is never made so fragile 
again’.2 Three articles in the current issue examine NHS fragility. Richard Bourne 
and Steve Iliffe, the Foundational Economy Collective and Portia Roelofs all 
examine what the Covid-19 crisis has revealed about the NHS and how it might be 
built back better after the crisis; the watchwords for all are transparency, localism, 
experimentation, learning from others.  
But even the brutal experience of Covid-19 will not be sufficient to bring about deep 
change on moral – or even practical – grounds alone. There are massive, vested 
interests which will work against some of what we need to do to transform our 
economy. Appealing to liberal egalitarian ideals and a shared opposition to the far 
right won’t be enough. There are battles ahead, and this is the time to think about 
tactics and resources. Re-empowering trade unions is, for instance, one vital goal for 
the left; the proposal by Roelofs for highlighting the personal connections behind 
public sector contracts is another. Redistributing power and wealth will cause conflict.
Five years ago, Labour did not yet have a clear vision for how to bring about the 
necessary economic transformation. There were some important steps forward 
under Ed Miliband – most of all, the shift to focus on predistribution more than 
redistribution – but the practical apparatus was barely fleshed out. Labour seemed to 
be trapped in a bind; either proposing further New Labour-type policies, or going 
‘back to the 70s’ with nationalisation. This is no longer the case. There is now a core 
set of ideas – community wealth building, the Green New Deal, co-operatives, public 
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and collective ownership, the Foundational Economy and so on – and the debate on 
the left is no longer over whether this agenda represents the future, but in what 
precise form and combination. It has been developing over many years, in think-
tanks like CLES, IPPR and The Democracy Collaborative, in groups like the 
Foundational Economy Collective, and in the co-operative movement and local 
government. There are, to be sure, still vigorous debates to be had about the precise 
policies and priorities to be pursued, and policies and priorities will also need to be 
adjusted in the light of Covid-19. In recent posts on the Renewal blog, Stewart 
Lansley and Rajiv Prabhakar each pointed to different ways in which we might forge 
a post-crisis economic settlement based on cross-generational solidarity.3 But this 
important, ongoing debate over specifics should not distract us from the point that 
this is the only new economic project in town. 
And towns are important – as Renewal board member Lisa Nandy reminds us.4 The 
economic agenda has the power to tackle gross inequalities between individuals and 
households, but it also, crucially, addresses inequalities between places. As Jonathan 
Reynolds says in his review of Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill’s book, Community 
Wealth Building, in this issue:
Place matters, as does control. Growing up in Sunderland in the 1980s felt 
miles away from Westminster. Unemployment was very high and there was 
the sense that the Government didn’t care enough and that the people making 
the decisions about our local economy had never experienced what was really 
going on. 
Our desperate need for more effective regional and local economic strategies is 
suggested by the fact that even the Tories have now started to talk about ‘levelling 
up’, though their proposed confection of high-tech panaceas and major infrastruc-
ture projects – which ignore the everyday needs of ordinary people’s lives, for 
example the local buses on which so many more people rely – is unlikely to make a 
real difference.5
Many places which were ‘boom towns’ in the 1960s and 1970s, with cinemas, 
masses of pubs and clubs, local shops and community organisations, now have high 
streets lined mainly with betting shops, charity shops and takeaways. Decent work is 
much harder to come by, with the middle of the jobs distribution hollowed out. 
There are subtler shifts, too – going shopping, for example, used to mean going to a 
series of local shops where you would come to be known and tied into the commu-
nity. That’s no longer the case, and though most of us welcome the choice and 
convenience of supermarkets, many also mourn what’s gone. It can’t be recreated by 
going back: for one thing, that way of life relied on women mainly remaining 
housewives or taking only part-time work. But what’s valuable – a vibrant local 
economy, with ‘rooted’ local firms that do more than just sell goods, supported by 
local people earning decent wages and with time, too, to spend in their local 
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economy and community – can be appreciated and promoted now. We have seen 
many ‘rooted’ local businesses flourish over the past few months, as people reori-
ented their worlds to their neighbourhoods, and small businesses assumed the role 
of community hubs. But, again, there have been huge local, regional, and class 
disparities in our capacity to do this. Community wealth building, the co-operative 
movement, strategies for the foundational economy and ‘rooted firms’, as well as 
taking monopolies into public ownership and democratising the economy – 
together these provide a set of ways to create stronger, better local economies 
throughout the UK, in ways that do not depend on the affluence of the local cus-
tomer base and which are sustainable over the long term. 
This is not just important for the businesses themselves, or for the local economies 
they support, but for their customers. The re-designation of supermarket workers as 
key workers only underlined what the labour and co-operative movement has 
known all along: that production and consumption go hand in hand, and that both 
should be bound to the needs of the people through democratic control. We need to 
set aside our squeamishness over consumer rights, which has stemmed not only 
from a (gendered) desire to prioritise people’s rights as workers, but also from a 
feeling that this is a middle-class agenda, associated with the liberal politics of 
contract. Workers, after all, are consumers too, and their access to stable supplies of 
affordable goods, which have not been produced in conditions amounting to slavery, 
is a matter of public welfare. As Guy Ortolano (interviewed later in this issue) has 
pointed out, there is a rich ‘history brimming with social democratic ideas, initia-
tives, and real achievements’ to draw on here. Part of the tragedy of 1979 and what 
followed was that ideas such as the ‘property-owning social democracy’ were 
squeezed out by the idea that markets are entirely at odds with state provision. In 
reality, ‘creative and adaptable’ social democrats had long blended the two, and we 
should recover these traditions today.
While Labour’s economic project is emerging, it means little without a strategy to 
take power at a national level so that we can implement these policies: as Reynolds 
points out, local action ‘must be seen as complementary to action at the national 
level’. In this issue, we return to the old debate over who Labour’s base is – or 
should be – and how Labour should present itself today. Sebastian Jobelius and 
Konstantin Vössing trace the development of social democratic parties from being 
class-based parties (from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century), to 
adopting a ‘social compromise’ approach after 1945. They suggest that the time for 
both of these approaches is now past, and that social democratic parties must 
reorient themselves as parties of values. This would require a shift in mindset:
Becoming a party of values means not only to hold values, but to make values 
the decisive rationale for all aspects of party behaviour. Value-based social 
democratic parties would stop fashioning themselves as representatives of 
merely nominal social groups that exist only in the minds of party strategists. 
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They would derive and justify their policies in reference to universal social 
democratic values.
There is much to be said for these arguments. Class is no longer a strong determi-
nant of voting, while values are; a focus on values has the potential to move us past 
the tiresome stalemate between those advocating a focus on more educated, diverse, 
urban young people, and those preferring to foreground older, working-class people 
outside cities, usually imagined as white. A focus on values is, in some ways, the 
model of Claire Ainsley’s 2018 book, The New Working Class, and we can expect it to 
be influential within Starmer’s Labour Party now that Ainsley is Head of Policy. Her 
book suggested that the ‘new working class’ – a fragmentary category, of which the 
‘traditional’ working class, employed in industry, forms less than a third – is united 
by four values: family, fairness, hard work and decency, which should form the basis 
for policy-making. But talking about values doesn’t provide an easy fix to all 
Labour’s problems.
Jobelius and Vössing have in mind a constellation of ‘universal social democratic 
values’ – freedom, justice and solidarity – which, they argue ‘are widespread across 
different social groups’, having been produced through ‘socialization, personality, 
individual life choices, and material capital’. While their vision is transnational, Jon 
Lawrence, also in this issue, traces how social democratic values actually became 
embedded in British everyday life in the post-war years. The set of values he  
identifies – social entitlements linked to contributions, collective aspiration, and 
demotic individualism – has clear resonances with Ainsley’s four values, and could 
also be imagined as manifestations of Jobelius and Vössing’s justice, solidarity and 
freedom (in that order), but this is a somewhat rough-and-ready mapping, which 
underscores the importance of context and history. Rethinking Labour not as a party 
of social compromise but as a party of values will require us to immediately answer 
two questions: who gets to define our values? And who decides how they’re inter-
preted in real-life situations?
Jonny Ball, writing in this issue, offers a counterpoint to Jobelius and Vössing. 
Corbyn’s core support came from groups formed in opposition to the most damag-
ing tendencies of precarity capitalism; but, Ball suggests, these groups should form 
only one part of Labour’s coalition, along with the ‘traditional’ working class – he 
suggests we might call this ‘Corbynism with Blue Labour Characteristics’. There is 
something important in both these positions, though they seem opposed: Labour 
should embody our values while retaining a clear sense of our historical commit-
ments, our identity as a party of the working classes, even as we evolve. As Lea Ypi 
and Jonathan White set out in their writing on political partisanship: 
Partisanship is a long-term, cumulative activity. A party typically defines itself 
by goals that cannot be realised in the short term but that require constancy of 
political commitment across time – in Labour’s case including notions of 
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equality, justice, and collective responsibility … The party is the organised 
expression of a tradition: it is an association built up over time and projected 
into the future, centred on normative commitments intended to endure.6
The Labour Party is the organised expression of a tradition of working people 
collaborating with each other to improve their lives and redistribute power, wealth 
and opportunity. Our history makes us who we are, and we can’t forget it, even 
when we want to critique it. Our roots as the party of organised labour are impor-
tant, even if that tradition at its origins was too narrow (in particular, too male and 
too white) to comprise the whole of our identity now. But it is the capacity to grow 
outwards from those roots that gives us vitality. As Ortolano puts it, social democ-
racy is ‘a living tradition, grounded in history but not therefore bound by it, capable 
of developing in novel ways.’ Can we be both a party of values – a party that tran-
scends class – and a party which remembers our historic identity and our historic 
commitment to labour? Blue Labour has long talked fondly of the ‘politics of 
paradox’. But is it really so paradoxical? We are all many things at once, after all. 
As Labour Together’s 2019 General Election commission (discussed by Hannah 
O’Rourke in this issue) suggested, it will be in Labour’s economic agenda that we 
find a way to bring together young and old, town and city. This is the agenda that 
offers changes needed by both young, precarious urbanites, and the older residents 
of hollowed-out towns. Too often the idea that Labour ‘needs to have something to 
say to older, white, working-class voters in towns’ is taken to mean that we need to 
talk about being tough on immigration. But – and leaving aside for now whether or 
not this diagnosis is correct – the important thing for Labour is to have something 
positive to say about how our towns and villages can thrive again, and become 
places which younger generations don’t feel they have to ‘aspire’ to leave. The 
politics of place conceived in economic terms also offers a way for Labour to move 
beyond the false and restrictive opposition between nostalgic communitarianism 
and liberal individualism described by Forrester. It doesn’t essentialise locality as a 
matter of inherent identity, but does acknowledge its power in structuring our daily 
lives, relationships and opportunities. It insists that it should be possible to live a 
good life wherever you happen to be. 
Labour’s economic agenda is shaping up to be resolutely national, regional and 
local. But this does not – and must not – mean an abandonment of our historic 
internationalism. As Mehmet Erman Erol suggests in this issue, reviewing Jeremy 
Green’s Is Globalization Over?, we are living in the crisis phase of neoliberal globali-
sation. But this does not imply that an anti-globalisation or even 
nationalist-protectionist left is what we now require. Rather, Labour must push for a 
‘new global compact’ and a reworking of international institutions to bring about a 
‘progressive reglobalisation’. In light of the pressing danger of global fascisms, this 
is vital. 
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